Canadian Academy Discover, Publish, Thrive
Introduction:
Determining which films qualify as art and which do not is a subjective matter. While classics like “Un Chien Andalou” are widely acknowledged as art, mainstream Hollywood blockbusters and certain genres like sleazy porn may not receive the same recognition. The question of when a film becomes art raises debates on whether it’s limited to avant-garde or European art house films or should encompass a broader spectrum, including popular works like Anthony Mann’s noirs and Sergio Leone’s westerns. Some argue that the distinction between art and non-art in film is nonexistent, asserting that all films are art to varying degrees. This question extends beyond film enthusiasts, as it serves as a broader test for defining art in aesthetic theory. The author intends to explore and provide a theory for addressing the boundary question, emphasizing that film’s classification as art has implications for understanding art more generally.
1- Inclusive and Restrictive Views:
In the early era of cinema, some argued that film was not an art form but merely a record of artistic performances, akin to dismissive views towards photography. However, this perspective became difficult to maintain as film-making involved numerous creative choices, editing, and a final product distinct from an eyewitness account. Today, the prevailing opinion leans towards considering most films as art.
Noel Carroll, a notable advocate for this view, argues that mass-produced films, including TV sitcoms, qualify as art based on their genres, artistic practices, and alignment with classificatory theories of art. However, several objections challenge these arguments. Firstly, descent from artistic forms and genres does not guarantee art status, as exemplified by the unsettled status of comedies. Secondly, engaging in artistic production activities, such as using actors and choosing camera angles, doesn’t inherently qualify a film as art, raising questions about the inclusion of various genres like safety films and infomercials. Thirdly, Carroll’s claim that most films satisfy prevailing classificatory theories is debatable, as certain theories, such as Dickie’s Institutional Theory and Levinson’s Historical Theory, may not easily apply to popular films.
Carroll’s narrative theory, emphasizing the presence of traditional genres and forms, also faces challenges in categorizing popular entertainment films as art. The argument that denying art status to certain films implies a distinction between low and high art is contested, as there is a valid distinction between films that qualify as art and those that do not. The inclusive use of the term “art” is acknowledged, but there is a need to differentiate between “art” and a “work of art,” as not all instances labeled as “art” may meet the criteria of being a genuine artistic creation.
In conclusion, while there is an intuitive distinction between films considered art and those that are not, Carroll’s arguments for the inclusive approach remain inconclusive. A more productive approach might involve explaining the intuitive distinction rather than attempting to categorize most films as art.
To discern a boundary between films considered art and those that are not, one approach is to confine the label to “art films.” This term encompasses two main categories: films created by professional artists for display in galleries alongside visual arts, and films shown in independent theaters made by auteur directors, known for their distinctive style. Art house films, as noted by Bordwell, often share characteristics such as characters lacking clear goals, ambiguity, realism, and a tendency to challenge conventions rather than merely entertain.
While one may be tempted to assert that only art films qualify as art, and mass audience-oriented films do not, this stance can be defended by referencing prominent definitions of art, like Dickie’s idea that artworks are artifacts presented to the artworld public. Auteurs like Matthew Barney and Godard align with this definition, contrasting with mainstream films like “Jerry Maguire” or adult content like “Debbie Does Dallas.” Levinson’s historical perspective also suggests that auteur directors perceive their films as belonging to the realm of traditional art forms.
However, theories of art present a challenge when they yield negative judgments for films one might consider art, like those made for mass audiences such as “Raw Deal,” “The Searchers,” and “Tokyo Drifter.” These films, despite being intended for broad viewership and lacking ties to traditional fine art genres, possess clear artistic elements, such as stylized cinematography, complex character motives, and distinctive visual and auditory designs.
Numerous directors like Hitchcock, Chabrol, Powell, Renoir, Polanski, and Kurosawa are auteurs whose films target mass audiences and are released in mainstream theaters. Faced with such examples, three options arise: deny these films the status of art, attempt to show their accommodation within existing theories, or reconsider these theories as insufficient definitions of art for films.
Rejecting the elitist move of denying artistic merit to films not intended for a narrow cultural elite, the author argues against such a position. Additionally, it is highlighted that some films created for wider audiences possess more aesthetic merit than those made for the artworld. Theories like Dickie’s and Levinson’s may seem inflexible in accommodating films created outside established artistic institutions and traditions. Their limitations parallel broader issues with historical and institutional approaches, leading the author to advocate for exploring alternative perspectives in the subsequent section.
2- Film, Art, and Aesthetic Affordances:
Dickie and Levinson’s theories highlight the importance of creators’ intentions in achieving art status. However, sometimes viewers recognize certain works, not originally intended as art, as deserving of such status. Contrary to the idea that art is conferred by art-consuming audiences, the focus should be on the discovery process. The question arises: how does a viewer identify a film, not intended for a museum, as belonging to the category of art?
One initial answer suggests that a film becomes art when it shares similarities with pre-established art films. However, this view lacks specificity about the dimensions of similarity and fails to explain why art films are considered art in the first place. Resorting to aesthetic formalism, which emphasizes intrinsic features like color and shape, is also problematic as it neglects the importance of content.
While formalism acknowledges that art elicits an aesthetic response, it falls short by limiting this response to form alone. The proposal here is to expand beyond form, considering a range of features such as plot, creators’ intentions, and innovation. The idea is that a film is art when it affords an aesthetic stance, meaning it naturally invites being seen in a certain way.
The term “affordance” from Gibsonian psychology is used to capture the notion that films naturally invite a specific way of viewing. This aesthetic stance is not restricted to intrinsic film properties and may be influenced by factors like the filmmaker’s intentions. An “aesthetic stance” refers to a psychological state where aesthetic principles, triggering aesthetic emotions, are used to evaluate a work.
The theory suggests that a film becomes art when it affords the aesthetic stance, inviting the application of aesthetic principles like beauty, originality, and sensitivity to emotions. Unlike the prototype view, it doesn’t specify exact features but emphasizes the encoded aesthetic principles. This approach is advantageous as it directs attention to relevant features, potentially explains why art films qualify as such, and doesn’t necessitate comparing each film to canonical art films.
The strength of this account lies in its ability to categorize many non-art films as works of art by directors like Ford, Suzuki, and Hitchcock, without claiming that all films qualify as art. Certain genres, like holiday films and commercials, may not invite the application of aesthetic principles, making the distinction empirical and plausible.
There are several potential objections to the proposal discussed, and three key objections will be briefly addressed before concluding.
Objection 1: Some may argue that the proposal is trivial, as affordances are dispositional, and any film or object could be approached aesthetically. The response emphasizes that affording a response goes beyond mere allowance; it involves an invitation. While any film could be aesthetically viewed, only some explicitly invite that perspective. The counterargument suggests that even readymades, like Duchamp’s, can be explained within an affordance theory, as presenting something as art inherently invites aesthetic evaluation.
Objection 2: Another objection questions the vagueness of the definition, as the degree to which a film affords an aesthetic stance may vary along a continuum. The reply embraces this consequence, suggesting that art may exist in degrees, with some works affording more aesthetic evaluation than others. This flexibility allows for the acknowledgment of borderline cases of art, exemplified by certain early British Hitchcock films.
Objection 3: A third objection posits that the theory implies there is no bad art, as ineptly crafted films may not afford the aesthetic stance. The reply refutes this by stating that affording an aesthetic stance does not guarantee a positive verdict. Films attempting beauty, innovation, or challenge may fail, and their attempt to invite aesthetic evaluation does not exempt them from being labeled as bad art. The distinction between an attempt and failure is crucial in addressing this objection.
The proposal acknowledges the possibility of additional objections targeting foundational assumptions, such as the existence of aesthetic emotions and principles. However, the author suggests that the proposed account of the aesthetic stance may not necessarily depend on these assumptions, leaving room for further exploration and debate.
Conclusion:
I have contended that a film can be considered a work of art when it provides an aesthetic experience. This proposition aims to navigate between two extreme perspectives: one suggesting that films are almost always art, and the other proposing that only art films qualify as art. While advocating for the aesthetic affordance view, I expressed reservations about certain prevailing art theories. The question arises whether this perspective could evolve into a general theory defining what constitutes art. This might be possible with additional conditions, such as restricting it to artifacts intentionally imbued with stance-affording features. However, this aspect needs further exploration in a separate study.
In conclusion, it’s worth noting that film serves as a rich domain for testing and refining art theories. This realm poses challenges in delineating borders, as some prominent examples may not intuitively be considered works of art, while others clearly are. I outlined one approach, and I anticipate that continued contemplation of this issue can yield broader insights into the nature of art.
Source:
Prinz, J. (2010). When is Film Art?. Revue internationale de philosophie, 254, 473-485. https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.254.0473