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Arms control and disarmament have been consistent topics at the United Nations (UN) since its inception. However, progress was limited until 1993, as the top five arms-producing nations held permanent seats on the UN Security Council. Subsequently, international efforts resulted in the creation of legal instruments to regulate conventional weapons, such as the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).
Civil society played a crucial role in leading the push for these treaties, with Canada and Australia alternately supporting or impeding negotiations. The paper examines ten turning points across three phases of multilateral negotiation cycles to analyze conditions influencing these states’ engagement in treaty-making processes.
The analysis reveals that both Canada and Australia actively contributed to progress when political leadership, substantive expertise, and diplomatic resources were present. Conversely, when these factors were lacking, progress slowed, and attempts were made to weaken treaty substance. This underscores the importance of considering multi-layered internal and external contexts when analyzing negotiations, emphasizing the need to understand how political leadership impacts the achievement of progress. The paper is structured into four sections, defining phases and turning points, describing ten key moments, analyzing cases of championing and blocking, and concluding with the significance of contextual analysis in understanding negotiation outcomes.
Phases and turning points:
In the realm of multilateral negotiations, a framework is essential to simplify the intricate dynamics and longitudinal changes involved in reaching outcomes (Zartman, Crump, 2003). Analyzing decades-long negotiation processes necessitates an explanatory framework that can capture the dynamic nature of negotiating contexts and the multi-layered policy environment surrounding treaty-making. The complexity is further heightened as conventional weapons policy intersects with various policy areas such as aid, trade, foreign policy, defense, military procurement, and even sports related to small firearms. Negotiation processes typically follow linear journeys, with phases focusing on different strategic elements that accumulate over time, progressing unevenly. Scholars often categorize negotiations into political and technical phases, employing three-step and four-step approaches.
In the context of weapons treaty-making, the multilateral negotiating process spans diplomatic conferences, preparatory work in inter-sessional meetings, and the entire mobilization and policy formulation process within and between states (Krause, 2011). Examining these elements involves delineating phases and identifying transition points to draw patterns, challenges, strategies, and tactics across cycles. The methodological journey for this paper began with the negotiated outcome, extending into a longitudinal analysis, emphasizing turning points as crucial events within negotiation cycles (Druckman, 2001). These turning points consist of precipitants, departures, and consequences, with a focus on broader turning points for brevity.
The identification of phases and turning points relies on concrete outputs, public decisions leading to formal multilateral settings, and interviews with participants. Interviews play a unique role, bridging the gap between practitioners’ lived experiences and researchers’ methodological foundations. To substantiate participants’ claims, the article draws on primary and secondary sources, including interviews, seeking to capture different actors’ perceptions and strategies. Three distinct phases per treaty cycle—commitment, substance, and agreement—emerged, marked by turning points. The paper explores three cycles: the Ottawa Process, the Oslo Process, and the ATT Process.
The negotiation process for humanitarian arms control can be divided into three phases: Commitment, Substance, and Agreement.
In the Commitment phase, a group of states committed to future negotiations is gathered over years, often originating from civil society and experiences in post-conflict areas. Core groups of states build trust in existing forums, and when opportunities arise, they tap into alliances based on known positions or politics. Draft political declarations or UN resolutions are circulated to signal political commitment.
The Substance phase follows explicit commitment, where the core group shapes the treaty’s elements and proposes negotiation processes. This labor-intensive phase involves outlining the treaty’s contours, mapping substantive inclusions, and canvassing outlying countries to identify positions. Diplomatic efforts focus on increasing membership, and parameters for negotiation are agreed upon before issuing formal statements or draft resolutions.
The Agreement phase is the shortest and involves negotiating the final text of the treaty during a diplomatic conference lasting 1 to 3 weeks. Conference presidents, chosen based on experience, mediate between diverse positions. Changes in player positions may occur, influenced by external events. Despite potential politicization, talks generally reach a result due to the momentum required. The final treaty’s strength may be influenced by large players, and the decision-making processes play a crucial role in building legitimacy and advocating for universalization.
Ten turning points:
Ottawa Process
Turning point 1: adoption of the Ottawa Declaration
In 1995, Canada, led by Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, sought to promote a ‘human security’ agenda, shifting focus from state-centric security policies to prioritize people and communities. This initiative aligned with Liberal party principles and aimed to unify actions amid Quebec’s potential secession. Recognizing the urgency surrounding landmines, Canadian officials identified an opportunity during the 1995 Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Weapons (CCW). As the CCW Conference concluded without progress on landmines, Canada proposed a strategy conference in Ottawa in 1996, attracting 67 participating states. During the Ottawa Strategy Conference, Canada’s surprise call for a ban, supported by the ICRC and the ICBL, set the stage for the eventual Ottawa Declaration signed by 50 states, showcasing Canada’s proactive approach in collaboration with key international entities.
Turning point 2: adoption of the Brussels Declaration
Over a span of 16 months, 50 states publicly expressed their political commitment to pursue a ban on anti-personnel mines. Numerous meetings were held in various capitals to discuss the specifics of the treaty, accompanied by regional conferences, workshops, and bilateral meetings worldwide to garner support. Canada played a pivotal role in coordinating these efforts through its Non Proliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament Division, working closely with the ICBL NGO coalition and the ICRC. The Brussels Conference in April 1997 saw the signing of the Declaration by 97 out of 156 participating states, laying the foundation for subsequent diplomatic negotiations leading to the final treaty.
Turning point 3: adoption of the MBT
On September 1, 1997, the Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Land Mines took place in Oslo, Norway, lasting three weeks. Despite initial progress in drafting a treaty, the entry of the US and their push for a Korean exemption and extended transitional period led to tensions. Facing rejection, the American delegation withdrew on the second-to-last day. The next day, 90 states adopted the final text of the MBT, which was opened for signature in Ottawa on December 3-4, 1997, and came into force on March 1, 1999, with 71 signatories. The MBT became the fastest global arms control treaty to enter into force in the 20th century, and the ICBL and its coordinator, Jody Williams, were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 for their efforts.
Oslo Process:
Turning point 4: adoption of the Oslo Declaration
In 2006, conflict in Southern Lebanon resulted in the widespread deployment of cluster bombs by Hezbollah and Israel, posing a grave threat to civilians due to unexploded munitions. A group of nations, led by Norway and including Austria, Belgium, the Holy See, Ireland, Lebanon, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Sweden, and Switzerland, sought stronger rules to address the humanitarian concerns. The 2006 Third Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Weapons (CCW) failed to initiate negotiations for a legally binding instrument. Consequently, Norway convened an international conference in Oslo in 2007, where 49 states adopted the Oslo Declaration, committing to establish a treaty by 2008 prohibiting the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions causing “unacceptable harm to civilians.” The ambiguous definition of “unacceptable harm” raised interpretation challenges, leading to subsequent meetings in Lima, Austria, and Wellington to refine substantive elements for negotiations.
Turning point 5: adoption of the Wellington Declaration
Over the course of 12 months between the Oslo and Dublin Diplomatic Conferences, a complex technical and legal argumentation unfolded to define cluster munitions. The pivotal issue revolved around the military utility of these munitions, with new research commissioned by the Norwegian Department of Defence challenging conventional wisdom. The study revealed that cluster munitions equipped with self-neutralisation or self-destruction mechanisms could fail, heightening the risk to civilians. The Wellington Conference marked a turning point in the disarmament process, introducing the challenge of interoperability as a potential destabilizing factor. Tensions arose among US allies, particularly regarding military obligations under alliances. The Like-Minded Group, influenced by the US, expressed concerns about the treaty’s scope, focusing on protecting existing stockpiles and ensuring the future viability of joint military operations. Diplomatic pressure from the US State Department intensified in the lead-up to the Wellington and Dublin Conferences. Despite the challenging diplomatic environment, the Wellington Conference concluded with a surprisingly progressive outcome, thanks to Ambassador Mackay’s ability to navigate pressures and accommodate the concerns of smaller delegations. The compromise proposed by the New Zealand delegation, incorporating alternative text from the Like-Minded Group, paved the way for final talks in Dublin. In the end, the Wellington outcome represented the majority of states’ views rather than being dominated by major states.
Turning point 6: adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions
The Wellington Declaration paved the way for a two-week diplomatic conference in Dublin from May 19-30, 2008, where 107 states collaborated on the draft treaty appended to the declaration. The conference benefited from strong guidance by designated Friends of the Chair in thematic subgroups, leading to key breakthroughs with the acceptance of the definitions formula. Notably, the inclusion of a controversial sub-clause on interoperability in article 21 stirred debate. The collaborative efforts of progressive states, non-state actors, and victims’ voices from 350 organizations across 90 countries played a pivotal role in sustaining momentum and ultimately establishing a prohibitions regime within 14 months.
Canada and Australia and the Oslo Process:
During the Oslo Process, both Canada and Australia actively participated in all three phases, with Canada being the first NATO state to officially endorse the Oslo Declaration. Following the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), Canada underwent a shift in government from the Chretien and Martin Liberal administrations to Steven Harper’s Conservative government in 2004. This change, coupled with evolving international security concerns, led Canada to adopt a cautious approach, especially regarding the use of cluster munitions. Unlike their stance on landmines, Canada and Australia pursued an incremental path toward a partial ban on cluster munitions, favoring negotiations within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) rather than outside the UN.
Australia maintained a balanced position during the Oslo Process, considering both humanitarian and military aspects, with a focus on the operational impact on its strategic military alliance with the US. Both countries aimed to shift discussions away from the progressive track of the Oslo Process to the gradual approach within the CCW. The Oslo Process served as a lever for Canada and Australia to exert pressure on cluster munition producers and users within the CCW, hoping to expedite progress in that forum.
However, the dual-track strategy faced challenges during the final phase in Wellington, where Canada and Australia found themselves confined to the Wellington Declaration and expressing dissatisfaction with the limited consideration of diverse opinions. The suspension of the CCW track in June made it impossible to starve the Oslo Process of support, leading the Like-Minded states, including Canada and Australia, to reluctantly commit to multilateral action on cluster munitions in Dublin. Interoperability emerged as a red line for Canada and Australia, influencing the final text in Dublin, where they sought to balance public concerns about humanitarian crises with the imperative to maintain strong military relations with the US. The outcome in Dublin satisfied US allies but drew criticism from progressive states and civil society, with Canada and Australia framing their support in humanitarian terms.
ATT Process:
Turning point 7: adoption of UN Resolution
In the 1990s, civil society advocated for global standards to prevent irresponsible arms transfers, culminating in the 2001 UN Programme of Action (PoA). In 2004, spurred by NGO lobbying, the UK announced support for an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) amid Iraq-related debates. This initiated a campaign led by Jack Straw. In 2005, a group led by the UK, with Australia and others, pushed for ATT progress at the UN PoA review, marking the beginning of international commitment. The resolution sought input from states and initiated technical work under Roberto Garcia Moritan.
Turning point 8: adoption of UN Resolution
Between 2007 and 2012, numerous technical forums convened in New York, engaging both technical experts and state diplomats in nine sessions. The UN General Assembly resolutions specified parameters for each phase, requiring majority approval for the type of working body, scope of activities, end output, timing, and method of work. This framework established a negotiation baseline, adhering to President Obama’s consensus rule for US participation. The working groups revealed stark differences among states, with ‘Friends of the ATT’ (Iran, North Korea, Syria, and intermittently Cuba, Pakistan, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe) expressing skepticism due to concerns about arms import sanctions. Established and emerging arms exporters generally supported a limited treaty to safeguard their technology access and export markets. Progressive states advocated for a comprehensive treaty prohibiting exports linked to human rights and international humanitarian law violations, with some, like Iceland, emphasizing gender-based violence. Centrist progressive states sought stricter export standards, while the most progressive states and civil society focused on a long-term goal of reducing arms circulation.
Turning point 9: Diplomatic Conference fails to adopt draft treaty
From 2011 to 2012, four preparatory committee meetings were held to define and outline the future treaty, including its scope and diplomatic conference procedures scheduled for July 2012. These meetings worked towards bridging the gap between progressive and skeptical states, aiming to create a universally accepted legal instrument involving both arms exporters and importers. Led by Ambassador Moritan, the July 2012 conference in New York, however, concluded without consensus on the final text. The US requested more time on the last day, and countries like China and Russia expressed incomplete support for the draft text.
Turning point 10: adoption of ATT by UNGA:
Despite the initial failure of the Diplomatic Conference to reach a consensus on a final text, a second conference was scheduled in December 2012 through UNGA Resolution 67/234. This “Plan B” provision allowed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to remain on the UNGA agenda, subject to a majority vote if consensus was not achieved. Australia, strategically positioned, took charge of the talks under Ambassador Peter Woolcott after the resignation of Ambassador Moritan. Woolcott’s conciliatory approach, in contrast to Moritan’s abrasive style, successfully bridged the gap between progressive and skeptical states, leading to the ATT’s adoption in 2013 by majority vote in the UNGA after consensus was blocked by Iran, DPRK, and Syria.
Championing:
Canada and Australia have pursued distinct approaches in championing their respective diplomatic processes. A comparative analysis reveals three key patterns: political leadership, substantive expertise, and diplomatic resources. In Canada’s case, Foreign Minister Axworthy played a pivotal role in exerting pressure during the Ottawa Process, particularly by setting a target end-date for treaty talks without prior notice to supporting states. Diplomatic resources, including staffing and financing, were crucial for sustaining the process, with DFAIT instructing missions worldwide to provide assistance. Additionally, DFAIT’s substantive expertise, involving arms control experts and seasoned multilateralists, expedited the fast-track process, with IDA collaborating closely with NGO partner ICBL, which was primarily financed by DFAIT and played an equal role in the Ottawa Process.
Australia and the ATT Process:
Australia played a pivotal role in the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Process by providing consistent political leadership, sustained diplomatic commitment, coalition-building, and procedural expertise over seven years. This effort spanned different governments, showcasing Australia’s dedication to advancing technical aspects while navigating the complexities of a consensus-driven environment. As a US ally and major importer of US weapons, Australia facilitated communication with Washington, a crucial factor for progress in the treaty negotiations. Australia’s delegation, unique for including both diplomats and technical experts, earned a reputation for substantive expertise and diplomatic pragmatism, positioning the country as one of the eight vice-chairs in the preparatory process.
While supportive of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights Law (HRL) provisions, Australia demonstrated flexibility on issues like the treaty’s scope to maintain consensus. Financial support from Australia facilitated the participation of Pacific, Caribbean, and African states in the treaty negotiations, contributing to Australia’s bid for a temporary seat on the UN Security Council. During the agreement phase, when talks faced challenges, Australia’s reputation led to the appointment of Disarmament Ambassador Peter Woolcott as President of the 2013 Diplomatic Conference. Woolcott’s strategic approach, commitment to consensus, and adept use of UN procedures, including the “eclipsing” tactic, were instrumental in achieving majority adoption of the treaty, highlighting Australia’s crucial role in sustaining momentum within the UN machinery.
Blocking:
The examination of ten pivotal moments reveals a fluctuating pattern in supporting and obstructing treaty-making processes. Canada and Australia, initially aligned in blocking progress during the Oslo Process, diverged due to Canada’s past humanitarian stance and Australia’s later progressive approach in the ATT Process. Despite Canada’s history of advocating for weapon bans, Australia consistently preferred arms control within the UN disarmament framework. In the Oslo Process, both nations aimed to steer talks towards a limited-scope protocol within the UN framework to maintain a strong relationship with the US, which favored a gradual approach on cluster munitions. Despite concentrated diplomatic efforts, they failed to shift talks to the CCW, resulting in acceptance of the Wellington Declaration’s procedural maneuver. In the final stages, Canada and Australia, consulting with Washington, focused on including interoperability in article 21 to mitigate the impact of the inevitable treaty on joint military operations. The forceful tactics employed could have weakened the treaty had talks been redirected to the CCW.
Conclusion:
This paper critically examines Canada and Australia’s diplomatic roles in negotiating three international disarmament treaties, analyzing their parallel yet distinct tracks. The study reveals that successful treaty-making hinges on political leadership, diplomatic resources, and substantive expertise. The absence of political leadership in addressing cluster munitions, despite allocated resources, resulted in a legal instrument not aligned with initial positions. The findings underscore the need to consider multi-layered internal and external contexts, emphasizing the influence of political processes on negotiating positions and outcomes.
Source:
Horn, T. (2018). Different diplomatic tracks to disarmament. Négociations, 29, 21-38. https://doi.org/10.3917/neg.029.0021